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United States Policy in the
Hemisphere
Influencing the State and Beyond
BY FRANK O. MORA AND BRIAN FONSECA

U

nited States—Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) relations are strong, and more
importantly, built on a broad base of sophisticated, organic relationships that extend
well beyond state-to-state engagements. Furthermore, U.S.-LAC relations encompass far
more than what is often covered in the commentariat—like the number of presidential visits, the
emergence of extra-hemispheric actors, problems related to drugs and immigration, or when
compared to the visibility of U.S. engagements in others parts of the world. These outdated measures fail to truly appreciate the complexity and depth of U.S.-LAC relations today, all of which
are the result of our persistent and deliberate engagement with the Americas. As former Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton argues, “the United States needs to build on the ‘power of proximity.’ It’s
not just geography—it’s common values, common culture, and common heritage. Its shared
interests that could power a new era of partnership and prosperity.”1 This article argues that in
this context the role of the U.S. government must evolve from that of primary actor, to designer/
implementer of the enabling environment most conducive to the continued growth of organic,
non-state relationships throughout the hemisphere, and offers a new set of measures that better
reflects the strength of relations between the U.S. and its hemispheric partners.
Deepening democratic principles, improving human security, and creating opportunities for
economic growth and integration continue to be central to ensuring regional stability and advancing our interests in the hemisphere. This is not a departure from the national interests articulated
by previous U.S. administrations, nor should it be. The difference lies in our capacity to expand
influence in the increasingly interconnected global context in which U.S.-LAC relations take place.
On this increasingly crowded global stage, the U.S. Government must be competitive; we must
offer a vision of universal values that is unifying, compelling, and appealing, to citizens across
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the world. Given our shared history, similar
cultures, increasing economic and social ties,
this message will resonate strongly in this
hemisphere. Globalization continues to force
the region to rapidly adapt to political, economic and social currents, and improvements
in access to information provide individual
citizens with better connectivity and, in many
cases, greater influence over their respective
governments. Differences in adapting to globalization are producing a region more differentiated than ever before. Thus, U.S. policy
must be recalibrated to match the evolving
strategic environment, tailored to the increasingly pronounced differences among countries
in the region, and inclusive of the full range of
actors populating the hemisphere (states, nonstate actors, and individual citizens).

The Strategic Environment
U.S. policy must be built on a strong understanding of the strategic environment in which
U.S.-LAC relations take place. It is only in the
last few decades that U.S. policy towards the
region began to take into consideration key
elements influencing these relations, such as
the increasing global integration of the
Americas, growing differentiation among
nations of the Americas, “including their willingness to partner with the U.S., and the multiplicity and diversity of relations within and
beyond the hemisphere.”2 The dynamic strategic environment that characterizes hemispheric relations today is often not clearly
understood by many who continue to have a
very state-centric understanding of the region
and of U.S. policy. The need for policy to
reflect and respond to this rapidly evolving
context is paramount if Washington is to continue deepening ties and strengthening its
influence in the region.
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In world politics the state remains the
most important actor, particularly in the area
of security and the establishment and maintenance of international norms and practices.
Bilateralism and multilateralism remain critical in exerting influence. Policymakers have yet
to truly appreciate the impact of non-state
actors beyond the often-mentioned terrorist
and transnational criminal organizations.
Businesses, religious organizations, and social
movements and their structured networks
across borders, are impacting international
politics; transnational ties between these
groups have tangible effects on the politics of
their “home countries.” In terms of U.S.-LAC
relations, dense interactions among non-state
actors have become the true determinants of
hemispheric relations. In fact, the complex
network of inter-American non-state relations,
particularly in the social and commercial
spheres, has grown exponentially in the last
few decades. Chris Sabatini argues that these
interactions and exchanges “have often outstripped formal state relations and helped
move governments in directions that state
bureaucracies would not normally steer themselves.”3 For example, non-state actors continue to drive many states to acknowledge and
address endemic corruption, human rights
violations, and a wide range of socioeconomic
inequalities.
The distribution and diffusion of power
from the traditional centers of political and
economic authority has heightened the capability of non-state actors and individuals to
shape and influence global affairs. With regard
to U.S.-LAC relations, states continue to play a
dominant role but other actors and their networks also enhance interconnectivity leading
to more complex and dynamic inter-American
relationships. For this reason, the United
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States government should lead and coordinate
a whole of nation effort that leverages existing
and potential engagements along the three levels of U.S.-LAC interaction: state, non-government and individual. The connections are fluid
and dynamic, allowing states to engage and
collaborate with non-state actors to achieve
mutual objectives. For instance, the publicprivate partnership programs in the economic
and social realms (e.g. “100,000 Strong in the
Americas” education initiative and the
“Connecting the Americas 2022” electricity
generation program) in which Washington
works with the private sector and community
leaders in the U.S. and across the hemisphere
to meet important needs while helping to
deepen inter-American connectivity are the
most dynamic kinds of contacts occurring
today.4 The U.S. government must leverage
and coordinate these actors and opportunities
since these types of interactions offer the most
effective means of advancing U.S. interests and
influence in the new inter-American strategic
context.

Converging Hemispheric Interests
A key characteristic of hemispheric relations
today is the growing convergence on key issues
and concerns—and subsequently, interests—
facing the hemisphere. For instance, the 2003
Declaration on Security of the Americas integrated different perspectives regarding security
threats and priorities that included terrorism,
corruption, illicit trafficking and weapons proliferation.5 Differences remain as to perceptions of severity and the appropriate means to
address these challenges, but a consensus persists around those threats more than a decade
since the Declaration. Since then, the consensus expanded and focused on key issues,
including energy, climate change, inequality,
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social inclusion (e.g. LGBT and indigenous
rights), crime and violence and competitiveness. Political-ideological differences emerged
in the new century impeding inter-American
collaboration in some areas, but the consensus
and opportunities for mutual collaboration
continued to mature, in part thanks to efforts
by social and economic entities, such as religious organizations, universities, and human
rights organizations (many transnational) and
their determination to keep the issues at the
forefront of the hemispheric agenda.

A Differentiated Hemisphere
Countries in the hemisphere continue to make
strides in their political, economic, and social
developments—and all in the context of an
increasingly interconnected, multipolar world.
However, there are some clear differences
among countries in terms of demographics,
economy, territory, social development and
institutional capacity to confront the challenges and opportunities of globalization.
Comparing the economic size and institutional capacity of Honduras to Brazil or Chile
underscores these differences.
While democracy remains the preferred
form of government throughout the hemisphere the quality of democratic practices varies in the region. Progressive social initiatives
over the last few decades have led to improvements in access to education and health and
reduction in poverty rates in most of South
America, but the quality and access remain
problematic, particularly in Central America.
Progress, therefore, remains uneven, and in
some cases reversing, producing greater differentiation than ever before in terms of the quality of governance. In other words, the increasing differentiation lies in the capacity and
performance of states to deliver governance
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and development. Again, comparing state
capacity and performance between Chile and
Guatemala, for example, in delivering public
goods effectively, particularly in the area of
citizen security—the main challenge facing
Guatemala and most of its Central American
neighbors—highlights the differentiation that
exists in LAC.
As the quality of democratic practice varies within the region, there are strong national
differences in perceptions of the performance
of democratic institutions reflecting those differences. According to Vanderbilt University’s
AmericasBarometer, public support for democracy is over 65 percent in LAC.6 However, the
consolidation or performance/quality of
democracy differs across the hemisphere and
continues to struggle in the Andean Region,
Central America, and Haiti. Economist

72 | FEATURES

Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index only
ranks five hemispheric countries as full democracies: Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the United
States, and Uruguay. Most of the hemisphere
varies between flawed democracies and hybrid
regimes, with Cuba and Haiti characterized as
authoritarian regimes (see figure 1).7
Furthermore, institutions continue to struggle
to achieve legitimacy, and widespread corruption is undermining institutions’ effectiveness
in delivering security, justice and inclusive
socioeconomic development; this is particularly the case in Central America but still
extant in much of LAC.
Public opinion indicates that trust in
political and social institutions is declining.
While trust in the Catholic Church and the
Armed Forces remains high throughout the
region (see figure 2), improving political and
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social institutions is the preeminent challenge
facing the consolidation of democratic rule
across the region. Recent social protests in
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Honduras, for
example, are signs that structural reforms
remain incomplete. In the end, as Hillel
Soifer’s recent book “State Building in Latin
America” underscores, the challenges to the
region’s democracies is more fundamental
than weak rule of law, bad infrastructure and
poor schools—it’s about state capacity and the
political will to institute necessary reforms.8
Access to health and education is increasingly becoming more available to historically
marginalized populations though quality, particularly in education, remains a challenge at
a time when Latin America lags in competitiveness. According to Americas Quarterly’s Social
Inclusion Index, there are vast variations in
social inclusion from one country to the next
(and even within). For example, women’s
rights are lowest in El Salvador, Guatemala,
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Honduras, and Paraguay, and highest in
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.
Poverty, inequality, and quality of health and
education figures also vary greatly between
countries with low levels of socioeconomic
development—Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
and Paraguay—and countries with higher levels, such as Uruguay and Chile.9 The disparities between socioeconomic indicators in
LAC’s precarious democratic environment are
giving rise to growing social and political turmoil and ferment
Hemispheric efforts to improve human
security over the last few decades have achieved
some important results. The region has made
remarkable progress in improving socioeconomic sources of human security. According to
the Human Development Index, most countries rank between 60 and 80 on a 0-100 scale
(see figure 3).10 Poverty (and extreme poverty)
reduction has been dramatic, from a high of
44 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in 2013,
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while uneven income distribution, one of the
greatest challenges for democracy and development, has improved with reductions of the
Gini coefficient of one percent a year during
the last ten years.11 Moreover, more than 50
million people have worked their way up the
social and income ladder in LAC in the past
decade to become members of the middle
class –an increase of over 50 percent.12
Despite this important progress, Latin
America’s middle class is precarious, at best—
they are an economic slump away from poverty. They have insecure jobs, weak purchasing
power and lack access to quality education and
health care for their children. But they also
have rising expectations, a new stake in the
political process, increased access to uncensored information via social media and a voice
that demands to be heard. If this new middle
class were to drop back into poverty, democratic governance could be further in peril.
Additionally, downward trends in inequality
and poverty have now leveled off, in large part
because of emerging economic stagnation and
pending structural reforms. In some countries,
like in the Southern Cone and the Caribbean,
poverty has begun to creep up. In Mexico, for
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instance, the number of poor increased by
more than two million since 2012.13
One key challenge faced by just about
every country in LAC is physical security.
Citizen insecurity is among the most pressing
concerns in LAC today, and one that is shared
across the hemisphere. The question of physical security is not associated with the threat of
inter-state conflict, which remains very low,
despite legacies of territorial disputes. Instead,
the nature of the threat is internal to states and
involves non-state actors (gangs and transnational organizations) and individuals (delinquents). According to AmericasBarometer,
more than half of LAC citizens perceive that
security has worsened over the last decade, and
citizens perceive physical security as the most
prevailing issue facing communities.14
Though citizen insecurity affects all, there
are some significant differences. Argentina,
Chile, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, for instance,
have homicide rates of less than eight per
100,000 in 2014. Conversely, El Salvador,
Venezuela, and Honduras recorded homicide
rates of more than 60 per 100,000; the highest
levels in the world.15 The same differentiation
applies to other crimes like kidnapping and
burglaries. Criminal organizations and gangs
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continue to proliferate in areas characterized
by weak governance and high socioeconomic
inequalities, and Colombia and Peru continue
to fight decades-long domestic, albeit considerably weakened, insurgencies. To that end,
centering notions of security on people, rather
than states, enables U.S. policy to target socioeconomic causes of insecurity by building state
capacity and promoting inclusive development.
Liberal economic policies remain the
norm throughout hemisphere, despite longstanding debates as to the role of the state in
domestic economies. For the most part, countries have made improvements in macroeconomic policy with some success. Inflation
remains relatively low in most countries, averaging six percent in 2014 for most of the
region. According to the World Bank, LAC’s
middle class is estimated to encompass nearly
30 percent of the population. However,
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degrees of success vary across the region (see
figure 4).
The IMF projects overall LAC growth to
decline for the fifth year in a row – from 1.3
percent in 2014 to a projected less than one
percent in 2015. The impact of global shifts in
commodity prices is negatively impacting
commodity exporters like Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, and Venezuela, while the cost savings
from the drop in oil prices is presenting economic opportunities to Central American and
Caribbean nations. Meanwhile, Chinese financial largesse may decline as its economic
growth slows and returns on existing loans
become underwhelming, reducing the hemisphere’s governments’ ability to fund budget
deficits.
Venezuela’s political and economic collapse could have severe consequences for
countries that are dependent on Caracas’ oil
supply guarantees and financial aid, namely
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Cuba, Nicaragua, and many countries in the
Caribbean. Brazil is in the midst of its worst
economic recession in twenty years while its
political system is facing a corruption scandal
that may lead to further institutional paralysis.
Economic stagnation and persistent inequalities coupled with institutional deficiencies and
lack of political will to deal with the structural
challenges facing these societies can lead to
further weakening of democratic rule and
enhanced social turmoil. U.S. policies in the
hemisphere must encourage long-term structural reforms in order to enhance accountability, market openness and overall global competitiveness.

United States policy should seek to reassert
visible leadership in multilateral and regional/
sub-regional organizations that advance common hemispheric interests. The U.S. should
not shy away from engaging “other” multilateral organizations—like the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
for example—even if these organizations are
viewed as largely ineffectual or seek to deliberately exclude the United States. The U.S.
should seek every opportunity to communicate its vision and policy to the region, to
states, regional bodies, and individuals alike—
constantly seeking to present, defend and
advance universal values.

Hemispheric Integration

United States Policy in the Hemisphere

The hemisphere continues to develop and
expand multilateral and regional/sub-regional
political, economic, social, and security institutions. Despite the growing numbers of institutions, results across the hemisphere are
mixed. Regional blocs like the Pacific Alliance
are outperforming the Bolivarian Alternative
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA)
and Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR). Organizations such as the
ALBA, the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR), the Central American Integration
System (SICA) and the Organization of
American States (OAS), among others, are
impaired by ideological overtones, differences
in regional priorities or issues of concern/interests, and lack of political will to truly integrate
and collaborate. Furthermore, institutions
remain largely state-centric missing opportunities to facilitate substantive engagement
beyond the state. Still, the presence of these
institutions is vital to creating opportunities
for inter-American integration and collaboration on a wide range of converging interests.

Unites States government policy is critical in
the expansion and deepening of U.S.-Latin
America relations at the levels of interaction
required to achieve influence (see figure 5).
Only the U.S. government is capable of defining and pursuing U.S. national interests, but
increasingly does so by using its instruments
of national power to encourage and create the
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Focusing instruments of power at all levels of
interaction advances U.S. national interests.
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space that enables the density of societal interaction across all of society in support of U.S.
interests. In this context, Washington continues to drive and influence the political and
legal framework by which not only states interact but non-state actors and individual contacts flourish. To that end, the U.S. must assert
its leadership in developing partnerships with
others in the hemisphere. As articulated in the
National Security Strategy (2015), the U.S.
must continue leading with strength, conviction, strategic vision, and with willing and
capable partners—using all instruments of
national power.16
As a way to describe the U.S. government’s
strategic approach in a dynamic, complex
hemispheric environment, this paper uses the
organizational concept of DIME (Diplomacy,
Information, Military, and Economics) to
structure and explain a policy by which the
U.S. can utilize the instruments of national
power to engage and influence the different
levels of interaction. These instruments of
national power overlap across the levels of
interaction, and when used effectively, the U.S.
can magnify the multiplicity of ties within
U.S.-LAC relations. In other words, U.S. influence and national interests lay in strengthening and deepening U.S.-LAC relations along
the different levels of interaction. Washington
plays a pivotal role in providing the appropriate framework for these ties to thrive.

Diplomatic
United States government interactions with its
counterparts in the hemisphere continue to be
the principal means of interaction and provide
the foundation and structure in which hemispheric relations build momentum. In terms
of the diplomatic tool, the U.S. must continue
working with governments, non-governmental
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actors, and even individuals to provide the
political and policy infrastructure and thrust
to enhance U.S. influence while making progress in areas of mutual interests, such as
strengthening democratic rule and human
rights; promoting economic opportunities and
integration; and addressing the challenges
associated with human security.
The U.S. should invest its diplomatic
resources on engaging throughout the
Americas and the Caribbean across all levels of
interaction. In North America, U.S. policy
should center on integration and cooperation
in energy, economic competitiveness, and
security. A recent report from the Council on
Foreign Relations indicates, “if the three North
American countries deepen their integration
and cooperation, they have the potential to
again shape world affairs for generations to
come.”17 Additionally, the U.S. should continue working with countries experiencing governance challenges, particularly those in
Central America and the Caribbean, to support
democracy promotion programs (rule of law,
transparency, and institution-building support) and partner with governments and nonstate actors to address the causes and consequences of human insecurity.
U.S. diplomatic interactions with willing
partners must continue to focus on strengthening the Inter-American system. United States
commitment to working through the Inter–
American System, particularly through effective organs such as the Inter American
Commission on Human Rights, Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, and the
Inter-American Defense College (to name just
a few), remains critical to advancing U.S. interests by way of facilitating and strengthening
collaboration along multiple levels of interaction. Strengthening and working through
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multilateral entities should remain central
because they can serve as useful platforms for
the advancement of universal values like
human rights, advancement of the middle
class, inclusive socio-economic reforms, combatting corruption, and protecting the environment. However, the current paralysis plaguing
the OAS in some areas undermines both interAmerican collaboration and the pursuit of U.S.
goals and interests. Nevertheless, the U.S.
should go beyond the status quo to reinvigorate a moribund system that has the potential
to advance shared approaches to hemispheric
challenges and opportunities.
As a complement to bolstering the interAmerican system Washington must continue
to leverage bilateral schemes with countries
that have the political will to work with the
U.S. on issues of mutual interest. The recent
bilateral agreement on climate change with
Brazil offers a useful example. However, there
are limitations to bilateralism as it constrains
the scope of engagement and the degree to
which a particular challenge can be addressed
in a highly transnational and rapidly evolving
environment. As a response to the paralysis of
multilateral mechanisms and the limitations
or narrowness of bilateral arrangements,
Moises Naim suggests a new path: “minilateralism.” By minilateralism Naim suggests a
“smarter, more targeted approach: We should
bring to the table the smallest possible number of like-minded countries needed to have
the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem” or set of problems. 18 This
type of diplomacy can include governments as
well as non-governmental organizations that
understand that the global or transnational
challenges of today cannot be solved by one
country or even a set of countries that does not
also include non-state actors. Supporting the
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Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern
Triangle and encouraging the deepening of the
Pacific Alliance process of economic integration (though the U.S. is not a member) provide effective opportunities to advance U.S.
interests in the region through minilateralism.
Finally, the U.S. can use diplomatic tools
working with other governments to promote
people to people interactions. By providing
the political and institutional support and
structure for funding, the U.S. can facilitate
interactions at the individual level. The most
recent example of this is the outreach to the
Cuban people by President Obama when he
announced a thawing of relations with Cuba
on December 17, 2014 and re-establishment
of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and
Cuba on July 20, 2015. The cornerstone of the
policy is recognition that people to people
connections matter and have the greatest prospects of achieving U.S. objectives and interests
on the island.
Another important example is the Obama
administration’s “100,000 Strong in the
Americas,” signature education initiative. The
program aims to increase the number of U.S.
students studying in the Western Hemisphere
to 100,000, and the number of Western
Hemisphere students studying in the U.S. by
the same amount by 2020. The initiative is
supported by a fund established as a publicprivate partnership aimed “at enhancing hemispheric competitiveness, increasing prosperity,
and providing study abroad opportunities to
better prepare a globally aware and culturally
competent workforce.”19 Student exchange is
nothing new but the priority and political support given by this program has created the context for this type of interaction to intensify and
advance U.S. interests and influence in the
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region. These are examples of appropriate,
innovative, and effective new initiatives.

Information
In this, the “information age,” the U.S. must
be prepared to understand and engage in twoway public diplomacy to proactively shape the
information space in support of U.S. policies
within the hemisphere. This approach recognizes that information is among the most
important instruments of national power as it
can efficiently access all levels of interaction.
When coupled with credible actions on the
ground, information can maintain and expand
U.S. influence in this hemisphere. Diplomatic,
economic, and military instruments have more
narrowly defined domains, and are to a significantly greater degree controlled by governments, but information is only constrained by
the lack of fluid and timely execution of communication related activities. By its very
nature, information transcends state borders
and facilitates interaction that enables bonds
to develop across states, non-state actors, and
individuals. United States public diplomacy
efforts should constantly stand up for and promote inter-American values and not be constrained by regional politics or the preoccupation of whether people like the U.S.
government or not.
Shaping the information space, as directed
by the National Security Strategy, is critical to
maintaining and promoting U.S. interests and
priorities. Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s
recent forays in the information domain to
counter unaccompanied minors crossing into
the U.S. from Mexico or to help prepare partner nations for the potential spread of an epidemic like Ebola highlight the negative effects
of an under resourced and poorly managed
i n s t r u m e n t o f n a t i o n a l p owe r i n t h i s
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hemisphere. Information related capabilities
(IRCs), such as public affairs/public diplomacy
and information operations are low-cost, highreturn capabilities that are required to advance
U.S. national interests and priorities. However,
trends are moving in the wrong direction. At
United States Southern Command, IRCs have
been cut by nearly 67 percent since 2013,
severely limiting the Department of Defense’s
ability to proactively engage with its regional
partners or counter misinformation disseminated by state and non-state actors; similar
trends exist in the Department of State as well.

By its very nature, information transcends
state borders and facilitates interaction that
enables bonds to develop across states, nonstate actors, and individuals
The U.S. should dramatically reform and bolster its public diplomacy capacity, focusing on
clearly defined messages to specific audiences
across the hemisphere. Public-private partnerships are also instrumental in reaching broad
audiences effectively. To expand U.S. reach and
impact, it should capitalize on trusted agents
to deliver its messages (i.e. local leaders, charities, business sector, etc.). The U.S. government’s messages must be built on a strong
understanding of the audiences—meaning the
information flow must be bidirectional. In
other words, the U.S. must listen to the needs
and interests of the hemisphere in order to
effectively pursue positive sum opportunities.
Social media has become an important
form of communication in the hemisphere,
being used as both an instrument of vertical
accountability and a means by which peopleto-people interaction occurs. Today’s rich
information environment has allowed citizens
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to voice their displeasure to the highest levels
of government, with social media serving as an
organization tool to hold its leaders accountable; recent anti-corruption protests in Brazil,
Guatemala, and Honduras were planned and
executed via social media outlets. Facebook,
Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube have successfully linked communities, both in-state and
internationally. Social media users are
expected to rise to nearly 300 million users by
2018, an increase from 214 million users in
2014.20 The U.S. government’s current attempt
to leverage social media falls short as it fails to
truly connect people and ideas—it simply
informs people about U.S. government activities. The U.S. must also attract the skill sets
required to optimize the tools available to
communicators today. The U.S. should better
organize and expand its use of social media, in
concert with other traditional forms of media
(radio, TV, newspapers, etc.), to inform the
hemisphere about U.S. policies, “and the people, values, and institutions which influence
those policies.”21
The U.S. lost a significant asset with the
dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA) in 1999, and the subsequent decentralization of IRCs across the interagency. This has
made it difficult for the U.S. to prioritize information programs and persistently deliver the
U.S. message across all levels of interaction.
Furthermore, the information space has
become exponentially more complex since
1999, with the advent of rapidly evolving new
media technologies, and a considerably more
competitive presence of external and non-state
actors in the region. Rather than focus on propaganda efforts—the negative association of
the USIA during the Cold War—the U.S.
should strengthen its information capacity to
promote democratic principles (transparency,
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free speech, freedom of expression, social and
economic equality, etc.), while countering
messaging efforts by state and non-state actors
that threaten the collective interests of the
hemisphere. If the political and budget environment in Washington were to allow, it is
worth considering the re-establishment of a
robust institutional information management
capacity to replace what was lost with the dismantling of USIA.

Military
The U.S. military will remain important in preserving and expanding common interests
across the hemisphere. The U.S. military’s
strong, long-standing relationships with its
counterparts in the region can and should help
ensure that these militaries maintain high levels of professionalism and a commitment to
democratic principles as they face unique challenges. Militaries across the hemisphere are
among the most trusted, adept, and influential
institutions in their respective governments
today—second only to the Catholic Church in
many countries. This is particularly important
given the declining legitimacy of other state
institutions (judiciaries, legislatures, political
parties, etc.). Somewhat worrisome, 40 percent of LAC citizens strongly support the military’s role in combating crime and violence,
compared to six percent that strongly disagree.22 LAC militaries are increasingly being
asked to serve in nontraditional roles, such as
domestic law enforcement activities, environmental conservation efforts, protecting energy
infrastructure, etc., many of which they are not
well prepared for. LAC militaries will remain
among the most influential institutions in at
least the near-to-medium terms, and thus, the
U.S. should strengthen military-to-military
institutional links across the region and ensure
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continuity in U.S. interests and democratic
principles.
The U.S. military’s primary mission in the
region must remain the professionalization of
militaries across the hemisphere. It should also
play a supporting role to the interagency in
combating the security challenges facing the
hemisphere—transnational organized crime,
gangs, cyber threats, corruption, human rights,
etc.—as well as continuing to build capacity in
areas that enhance professionalism and interoperability such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response (HADR).
U.S. military training should focus on deepening democratic and institutional reforms.
Military-to-military engagements should

continue to emphasize developing partner
nations’ institutional capacities, strengthening
transparency and civilian oversight, advancing
the protection of human rights, and promoting career development, all contributing to
overall defense institutions’ resource management capacity. The participation of regional
governments and non-governmental organization civilians in existing U.S. military programs
also encourages the promotion of domestic
and international confidence building measures that can extend beyond the state. One
example is the William J. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at National
Defense University that engages senior civilian
and military security and defense professionals
Department of Defense

Sandi Burges, Bridge Ministries founder, and a U.S. soldier hand out donated soap kits at the
Comayaguela Landfill in Honduras May 20, 2014.

PRISM 5,

no .

4

FEATURES | 81

MORA AND FONSECA

from around the region “to build strong, sustainable networks of security and defense leaders and institutions.”23
The U.S. military’s primary objective in
the region is the same as it should be across
the entire interagency community, strengthening institutional capacity in terms of uniformly
accepted democratic principles. As such, the
U.S. must review, and as necessary, modify and
align its policies, programs, funding, and
authorities to set the conditions and facilitate
the U.S. military’s ability to effectively engage
and achieve measurable progress. The tools
available to the U.S. military include military
training and education, military operations
and exercises, and arms transfer programs,
often through designated programs such as
International Military Education and Training
(IMET), Defense Institution Building (DIB),
Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI),
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign
Military Sales (FMS). Overall trends indicate a
decline in military assistance to the region.
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There has been a nearly 50 percent decline in
FMF in Latin America. IMET funding is significantly lower than FMF and has declined
slightly between 2011 and the total requested
in 2015 (see figure 6). The decline in resources
allocated to U.S. military engagement in the
hemisphere undermines our ability to bolster
our relationships with military institutions
across the hemisphere. Furthermore, hemispheric allies will look elsewhere for training
and technical support if U.S. resources continue to decline.
It is no secret that the bureaucratic and
cumbersome processes associated with FMF
and FMS weakens U.S. military engagement
efforts and undermines hemispheric preferences for U.S. equipment. These processes,
which are outdated, have become more burdensome over time. The U.S. should overhaul
these processes in order to bolster the U.S.
military’s capacity to provide infrastructure
and equipment to hemispheric militaries. For
now, given the current challenges in moving
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military equipment into the region, the U.S.
military should place greater emphasis on
building the people to people contacts
between U.S. civilian and military personnel
and security and defense professionals across
t h e h e m i s p h e r e. T h e Pe r r y C e n t e r f o r
Hemispheric Defense Studies, the InterA m e r i c a n D e f e n s e C o l l e g e, t h e S t a t e
Partnership Program—as well as the national
defense colleges across the hemisphere—are
all excellent venues to facilitate relationships
between U.S. and hemispheric military personnel. These programs should be expanded.
Additionally, USS Comfort, New Horizons,
Medical Readiness Training Exercises, Defense
Institution Building (DIB), and Humanitarian
Assistance Program (HAP) funds, for example,
build partner nation capacity and create vital
links between the U.S. military and hemispheric militaries. These activities should be
bolstered and remain at the forefront of the
U.S. military’s engagement portfolio in the
hemisphere.
Although the U.S. military is limited in its
ability to engage beyond the state, centering on
professionalization of the armed forces, with
emphasis on training and educational
exchanges, will reach all levels of interaction
and build institutional links vital to advancing
U.S. national security interests. Along these
lines, the U.S. also should focus on leveraging
capable and willing regional security exporters
like Brazil, Colombia, and Chile and engage
them in supporting less stable regions like
Central America.
The U.S. must also reconcile the role it
assigns to the U.S. military with the evolving
roles of LAC militaries. The U.S. should not
militarize its assistance to crime and violenceplagued countries in the region, namely
Central America. The focus should remain on
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prevention and institution building. However,
the U.S. military should stand ready to support
interagency efforts to help regional militaries
prepare for and mitigate the challenges associated with non-traditional missions. U.S. military engagement will prove more relevant
than critics ascribe as the trends of deteriorating security, prosperity and stability in the
region’s democratic states have led many countries to utilize their armed forces in efforts to
restore stability. The transnational nature of
many of the threats to these countries will
make the establishment of common values
between national militaries necessary to
improve their ability to meet these threats as
they cross each other’s borders.

Economic
Economic (and political) power are shifting
away from governments and toward non-state
actors, including individuals, who are increasingly shaping world events. Rather than getting
in the way of this process, the U.S. should recognize and encourage the distinctive economic
interconnections that exist between the U.S.
and countries in the region. For instance,
Washington needs to expand programs like the
Small Business Network of the Americas that
link small businesses in the U.S. with those in
the Americas offering an opportunity to share
experiences and know-how, while enhancing
prospects for the expansion of trade and
investments. They also create opportunities
for engaging in the region at a level with the
greatest impact on U.S.-LAC relations, helping
to sustain U.S. influence in the Americas. Also,
as discussed previously, private-public partnerships in the area of energy, financing and infrastructure development, for example, offer a
differentiated and effective mechanism by
which to promote U.S. economic interests
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“based on countries’ needs and capabilities
rather than historic one-size-fits all approaches
to the region.”24
In the economic realm only the state is
able to negotiate bilateral and multilateral
agreements providing the political and legal
framework governing all forms of economic
engagement and interaction. For instance,
without free trade agreements negotiated and
signed by states, like those the U.S. has with
Latin American countries facing the Pacific
(except Ecuador) or bilateral investment treaties which the U.S. has with a number of LAC
countries, private sector companies and investors would not be able to deepen economic
ties. There are also areas that need greater
efforts on the part of Washington and partners
in the region in order to deepen these ties.
Double taxation agreements, for instance, have
long been called for by the private sectors in
the U.S. and a number of Latin American
countries. This is a particularly sensitive but
significant issue in U.S.-Brazil relations. Such
agreements establish “common standards and
rules for each country’s tax revenue services, to
avoid double taxation. Avoiding being penalized by paying taxes twice encourages new
investments allowing for more productivity
and new jobs and trade.”25 By negotiating and
signing such agreements, governments enable
companies in the U.S. and the region to intensify their interaction, in turn, improving the
lives of citizens in the hemisphere and enhancing U.S. influence.
In the end, however, it is up to U.S. companies to take the initiative and engage a more
globalized regional environment in which
many companies from within and out of the
region are competing for markets and investment opportunities. The U.S. remains a dominant economic partner but alternatives
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abound. Despite diversification of trading
partners and sources of investments from
within and outside (mostly Asia) the region,
the U.S. remains the first or second trading
partner for nearly every country in the region,
while foreign direct investments (FDI) in Latin
America is twice as high as it was a decade ago,
making the U.S. the largest source of FDI in
LAC. A recent report from the Inter-American
Dialogue (2014) notes, that “from 2000-2012,
U.S. FDI in LAC increased by 83 percent, while
LAC FDI in the U.S. rose by 43 percent.”26 It is
also important to note that about 90 percent
of the $65.5 billion (2014) remittance income
destined to the Americas comes from the U.S.
These positive trends undercut arguments that
the U.S. is losing ground in the region. China
and other extra-hemispheric economic engagement in the region should not be seen as a
threat but in fact an opportunity for the U.S.
to ramp up its game and compete for markets
and investment opportunities. The U.S. must
leverage all the levels of interaction to expand
our economic interests that, in the end, are
mutually beneficial as this helps generate
growth, employment and development across
the Americas. Expanding trade and investments create the conditions for growth and
economic opportunities if coupled with the
appropriate structural reform that ensure that
all benefit from greater economic integration.
The U.S. government must continue providing a political, legal and bureaucratic
framework and the incentives necessary to
facilitate trade and investments. Efforts to defund or shutdown the Export-Import Bank and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
entities that promote small and medium businesses gain a foothold in emerging markets,
are short-sighted and counterproductive.
These agencies have a significant role in
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providing opportunities and employment for
U.S. and LAC businesses and workforces, while
helping to sustain our influence in the region.
This is the kind of engagement or interaction
that makes a real difference in shaping and
strengthening U.S-LAC relations.

Conclusion
For far too long experts and others that comment on U.S. policy toward LAC have failed to
align their analyses and policy recommendations with the ever more complex and dynamic
nature of contemporary U.S.-LAC relations.
Critics often use outmoded Cold War frameworks to suggest that U.S. is “losing ground”
in the region. Whether alluding to China’s
growth in trade and investments or recent diplomatic “inroads” by Russia and Iran, utilizing
zero-sum approaches ignores the complexity
of hemispheric relations in the 21st Century.
Finally, pundits point to the dramatic decline
in economic and military aid or the absence of
an all-encompassing policy with an exciting
moniker such as the Good Neighbor Policy or
the Alliance for Progress as proof that the U.S.
is ignoring the region and therefore ceding
influence to others with a clear anti-American
agenda. In today’s context, however, these are
not the best or most effective indicators for
measuring the true level of support for U.S.
policies or leadership.
The “real action” or impact is occurring
below the state at other levels of interaction
where non-state actors and individuals, such
as universities, small to large companies,
churches, transnational civil society organizations, media, etc. interact with their counterparts throughout the hemisphere in an organic
way giving texture and meaning to U.S.-LAC
relations. The role of U.S. government policy
remains critical in hemispheric relations
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providing the leadership and policy outlines,
international agreements, and political-legal
foundation through which the U.S. as a nation
engages the region. Globalization, technology
and the concomitant empowering of non-state
actors in the Americas has created space for the
different levels of interaction to engage one
another across borders in ways that make a difference in the everyday lives of citizens. It is
for this reason that U.S. policy should focus on
facilitating and expanding this interconnectivity, via the full range of instruments of national
power, to create a context for strengthening
partnership and opportunities for mutual gain
while helping enhance U.S. interests and influence in the Americas. PRISM
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